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We develop a logical framework for reasoning about knowledge and evidence in which the agent
may be uncertain about how to interpret their evidence. Rather than representing an evidential state
as a fixed subset of the state space, our models allow the set of possible worlds that a piece of evi-
dence corresponds to to vary from one possible world to another, and therefore itself be the subject
of uncertainty. Such structures can be viewed as (epistemically motivated) generalizations of topo-
logical spaces. In this context, there arises a natural distinction between what is actually entailed by
the evidence and what the agent knows is entailed by the evidence—with the latter, in general, be-
ing much weaker. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the corresponding bi-modal
logic of knowledge and evidence entailment, and investigate some natural extensions of this core
system, including the addition of a belief modality and its interaction with evidence interpretation
and entailment, and the addition of a “knowability” modality interpreted via a (generalized) interior
operator.
1 Introduction
In everyday speech, when we claim, say, that the grass being wet is evidence for its having rained recently,
the intended meaning seems to be that seeing the wet grass provides some sort of partial, imperfect,
defeasible reason to believe or consider it more likely that it rained recently. In sharp contrast to this,
many formal models of information update interpret evidence as being essentially infallible or factive.
Standard Bayesian updating, for example, tells us that to update a belief (i.e., a probability measure
pi) on the basis of an observation (i.e., a subset E of the background state space, the “evidence”), we
should condition pi on E , after which E is assigned probability 1 (see, e.g., [21, Chapter 3]). For another
example, AGM-style belief revision updates an initial state of knowledge/belief (captured by a set of
formulas) on the basis of some new information (i.e., a particular formula ϕ , the “evidence”) to produce
a new set of formulas that always contains the input formula ϕ [1, 20]. And a variety of logical models for
evidence and belief update assume that each piece of evidence corresponds to a set of possible worldsU
and entails exactly those propositions ϕ such thatU ⊆ [[ϕ ]] [24, 14, 26, 9, 7, 8]. Of special note are those
models in which the collection of evidence is assumed to take the structure of a topology [6, 12, 11, 2, 25];
the framework we propose can be viewed as a generalization of this paradigm.
In this paper we develop a logic for reasoning about evidence that is founded on distinguishing
what a given piece of evidence actually entails from what it is believed (perhaps erroneously) to entail.
Thus, in our models, evidence is factive but its interpretation can be uncertain. This is accomplished by
allowing the set of possible worlds that a given piece of evidence corresponds to to vary across possible
worlds, and therefore itself be the subject of uncertainty. Viewed as a generalization of topology, roughly
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speaking this corresponds to replacing each individual open set with a parametrized family of sets (with
the parameter taken from the underlying space itself).
This paves the way for a natural representation of several closely related phenomena including cali-
bration error (where an agent receives a signal from a measurement device but is uncertain or mistaken
about how that signal is related to the measured quantity), evidence “introspection” failure (where the
agent in fact has evidence for ϕ but lacks evidence that their evidence entails ϕ), and uncertain margins
of error (where the agent has taken a measurement with a certain margin of error, but is unsure what
exactly that margin is).
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review some of the syntax and
notation we will rely on in the rest of the paper. Section 3 introduces evidence models, motivating the
definitions with intuitions and examples (Examples 1 and 2) and situating the framework in the context of
existing paradigms (Observations 1 and 2). We also provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the
corresponding logic of evidence and knowledge. In Section 4 we extend evidence models to incorporate
belief, discuss some possible relationships between belief and evidence, and axiomatize the resulting
logics. Section 5 introduces a dynamic component to the models in the form of an evidence combination
operation, and explores how this additional structure can be used to define a notion of knowability; once
again, we provide an axiomatization of the relevant logics. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of
ongoing work. Omitted proofs appear in the full version.
2 Syntactic Preliminaries
We first specify a class of logical languages appropriate for the kinds of reasoning that concern us in
this paper. Given unary modalities ⋆1, . . . ,⋆k, let L⋆1,...,⋆k denote the propositional language recursively
generated by
ϕ ::= p |¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ψ | ⋆i ϕ ,
where p ∈ PROP, the (countable) set of primitive propositions, and 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Our focus in this paper
is on the trimodal languages LK,E,B and LK,E,2, and various bi-modal and uni-modal fragments thereof,
where we read Kϕ as “the agent knows ϕ”, Eϕ as “the evidence entails ϕ”, Bϕ as “the agent believes
ϕ”, and finally 2ϕ as “ϕ is knowable” or “the agent could come to know ϕ”. The Boolean connectives
∨,→, and↔ are defined as usual, and ⊥ is defined as an abbreviation for p∧¬p. We also employ Kˆ as
an abbreviation for ¬K¬, Eˆ for ¬E¬, Bˆ for ¬B¬, and 3 for ¬2¬.
(K⋆) ⊢ ⋆(ϕ → ψ)→ (⋆ϕ → ⋆ψ) Distribution
(D⋆) ⊢ ⋆ϕ →¬⋆¬ϕ Consistency
(T⋆) ⊢ ⋆ϕ → ϕ Factivity
(4⋆) ⊢ ⋆ϕ → ⋆⋆ϕ Positive introspection
(5⋆) ⊢ ¬⋆ϕ → ⋆¬⋆ϕ Negative introspection
(Nec⋆) from ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ ⋆ϕ Necessitation
Table 1: Some axiom schemes and a rule of inference for ⋆
Let CPL denote an axiomatization of classical propositional logic. Then, following standard naming
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conventions, we define the following logical systems:
K⋆ = CPL + (K⋆) + (Nec⋆)
KT⋆ = K⋆ + (T⋆)
S4⋆ = KT⋆ + (4⋆)
S5⋆ = S4⋆ + (5⋆)
KD45⋆ = K⋆ + (D⋆) + (4⋆) + (5⋆).
3 Evidence Models for Evidence Entailment and Knowledge
An evidence space is a tuple (X ,E, I) where X is a nonempty set of worlds, E is a nonempty set of
evidence states, and I = {Ie}e∈E is a parametrized family of functions Ie : X → 2
X . An evidence model
M= (X ,E, I,v) (over PROP) is an evidence space (X ,E, I) equipped with a valuation function v : PROP→
2X .
Intuitively, each e ∈ E represents a “state of evidence” the agent may be in—perhaps arising from
having made some observation, performed some experiment, found some clue, etc. Crucially, the agent
is not conceptualized as being uncertain about which state of evidence they find themselves in, but rather
about the interpretation of any such e ∈ E. In particular, the evidence e at world x rules out exactly
those worlds outside of Ie(x), so Ie(x) tells us what the evidence e actually entails at x. Call Ie(x)
an interpretation of e. These models therefore differ from many standard representations of evidence:
rather than representing evidence directly as subsets of the state space, states of evidence are treated as
abstract objects, each of which gets associated, via I, to various possible subsets of the state space—that
is, various possible interpretations.
Suppose x is the actual world and e is the evidence state the agent is in; then, intuitively, we should
have x ∈ Ie(x), since otherwise the evidence would rule out the actual world, which seems absurd. Say
that x and e are coherent when x ∈ Ie(x) and define
Ue = {x ∈ X : x ∈ Ie(x)},
the collection of worlds that cohere with e. Since these are precisely the worlds at which the true inter-
pretation of e is compatible with the world, intuitivelyUe consists of exactly those worlds at which e is a
possible state of evidence. Thus, when x and e are coherent (i.e., when x∈Ue), we call the corresponding
pair (x,e) an evidence scenario—we think of such pairs as being wholistic, self-consistent descriptions
of the world and the agent’s state of evidence, analogous to the “epistemic scenarios” of subset space
logic [24, 14, 26]. Similarly to subset space semantics, formulas will be interpreted in evidence models
not at worlds x but at evidence scenarios (x,e).
We are now in a position to formalize our notion of (actual) evidence entailment. Given an evidence
model M= (X ,E, I,v) and an evidence scenario (x,e) inM, we interpret LE inM as follows:
(M,x,e) |= p iff x ∈ v(p)
(M,x,e) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,x,e) 6|= ϕ
(M,x,e) |= ϕ ∧ψ iff (M,x,e) |= ϕ and (M,x,e) |= ψ
(M,x,e) |= Eϕ iff Ie(x) ⊆ [[ϕ ]]
e
M
where [[ϕ ]]e
M
= {x ∈Ue : (M,x,e) |= ϕ}, the truth set of ϕ with respect to e. We omit mention of M
when the model is clear from the context. A formula ϕ is said to be satisfiable in an evidence model M
if there is some evidence scenario (x,e) ofM such that (M,x,e) |= ϕ and valid inM if for all (x,e) ofM,
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we have (M,x,e) |= ϕ . Note that, by definition, if (x,e) is an evidence scenario we have x ∈ Ie(x), from
which it follows that these semantics validate Eϕ → ϕ ; that is, actual evidence entailment is factive.
Knowledge is often identified in epistemic models with what follows from the agent’s informa-
tion/evidence. In the present framework, however, this is arguably far too strong, since what actually
follows from the evidence is a fact about the world that the agent may not have any access to. Somewhat
more precisely: at the world x the evidence e entails Ie(x) (as a matter of fact), but of course the agent
might be uncertain about which world is the true world, and therefore uncertain about what e actually en-
tails. Nonetheless, even without knowing what the evidence e actually entails, they can at a minimum be
certain that whatever it entails, the world is compatible with that: in other words, the world is somewhere
in
⋃
y∈X Ie(y).
1 This motivates the following semantics for knowledge:
(M,x,e) |= Kϕ iff
⋃
y∈X
Ie(y)⊆ [[ϕ ]]
e.
In other words, the agent knows ϕ just in case ϕ follows from every interpretation of the evidence. Note
that under these semantics, the scheme Kϕ → Eϕ is valid but its converse is generally not. It is also easy
to see that K is an S5 modality, since the set
⋃
y∈X Ie(y) does not depend on the state.
Consider now the following natural condition:
(E1) y ∈ Ie(x) ⇒ y ∈ Ie(y).
This simply states that at every world x, the evidence entails that it coheres with the world. (E1) implies
(in fact is equivalent to) the following: ⋃
y∈X
Ie(y) =Ue.
Therefore, under (E1), given evidence e, the agent is in a position to know that the world coheres with
that evidence. This also implies that in evidence models satisfying (E1), the above semantic clause for
knowledge can be equivalently restated as
(M,x,e) |= Kϕ iffUe ⊆ [[ϕ ]]
e.
Note that since [[ϕ ]]e ⊆ Ue by definition, this semantic clause for knowledge is in turn equivalent to
Ue = [[ϕ ]]
e.
Next we observe that evidence models subsume standard relational (Kripke-style) semantics, as well
as subset space semantics.
Observation 1. Standard relational models (see, e.g., [13, 18]) of the form (X ,RE ,v), where RE is
the accessibility relation for a unary modality E , arise as a special case of evidence models when the
accessibility relation is reflexive: simply take E = {e} and define Ie(x) = {y ∈ X : xREy}. Then it is
easy to see that (E1) is satisfied (since RE is reflexive) and x |= Eϕ (in the relational model, i.e., when
E is interpreted by universal quantification over all RE -accessible states) just in case (x,e) |= Eϕ (in
the evidence model). Moreover, since Ue = X in this case, the knowledge modality in the evidence
1“But what if the agent doesn’t know that the actual evidence is e?” one might object. But the intent is for all uncertainty
about the evidence to be encoded in the state space—we take e to be an abstract description of the evidence that is broad enough
to be compatible with every possible interpretation thereof (as represented by the sets {Ie(y) : y∈ X}). For example, we might
imagine an agent who has pointed their measuring device at a phenomenon they wish to measure, and as a result they now see
the number 11.1 on a little display window. Perhaps they do not know the margin of error of this device, or to what degree it
is calibrated; perhaps they don’t even know what exactly it is measuring! But what they do know (plausibly, if we restrict our
attention to non-skeptical scenarios), is that the window reads 11.1.
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model coincides with the universal modality in the relational model, that is, (x,e) |= Kϕ (in the evidence
model) iff for all x ∈ X , x |= ϕ (in the relational model). This correspondence will play a crucial role in
our completeness proof for LK,E with respect to evidence models.
Observation 2. Subset space models [24, 14, 26] can also naturally be viewed as special cases of evi-
dence models. Given a subset space model X= (X ,S,v),2 we can take E= {eU : U ∈ S}, so E consists
of one evidence state for each U ∈ S, and define IeU (x) =U for all x ∈ X . Thus, each eU is interpreted
uniformly as corresponding to the subset U . Then M = (X ,E, I,v) is an evidence model which clearly
satisfies (E1) (since each IeU is constant) and we haveUeU =U . Therefore, (x,U) is an epistemic scenario
of X if and only if (x,eU ) is an evidence scenario of M, and moreover:
(X,x,U) |= Kϕ iff (M,x,eU ) |= Kϕ iff (M,x,eU ) |= Eϕ .
Example 1. Consider Williamson’s famous clock example [29]: you look at a clock and have a percep-
tual experience that seems to indicate to you that the minute hand is somewhere on the righthand side
of the clock. Let’s index the possible positions of the minute hand with the interval C = [0,60) in the
obvious way, so for example the state 15 corresponds to it being quarter-past, 30 to half-past, etc. The
perceptual experience you have is supposed to constitute evidence of some sort, with presumably some
margin of error involved. That is, if we call this perceptual experience e, we want to say that e doesn’t tell
us the exact position of the minute hand, but rather guarantees that it must lie in some interval containing
the true position in its interior. Call this the margin of error principle.
In our framework, we can and will incorporate a further type of uncertainty, namely, uncertainty
about the margin of error. This seems a very natural type of ignorance to model—after all, we may be
sure that our perceptions are not exact without being sure of exactly how inexact they are! One way of
capturing this scenario using a simple evidence model M = (C,E, I,v) is to define
Ie(c) =
{ (
c
2
, c+30
2
)
if c ∈ (0,30)
/0 otherwise.
Then it is easy to see that c ∈ Ie(c) iff c ∈ (0,30), and moreover for all c ∈C, Ie(c)⊂ (0,30), from which
(E1) follows. Note also that in every state c, Ie(c) contains c in its interior, so this model satisfies the
margin of error principle.
Suppose our primitive propositions include those in the set {post : t ∈ {0,1, . . . ,59}}, where post
is read “the minute hand is t minutes past twelve” and v is defined in the obvious way: v(post) = {t}.
Clearly, evidence is not “introspective” in this model, in the sense that the principle Eϕ → EEϕ can fail;
for instance, it is easy to see that (15,e) |=E¬pos6 since 6 /∈ (7.5,22.5) = Ie(15), but (15,e) 6|=EE¬pos6,
since for example 6 ∈ (4,19) = Ie(8) and 8 ∈ (7.5,22.5) = Ie(15). That is, at state 15, the evidence in
fact rules out that it’s 6 minutes past twelve, but doesn’t itself guarantee that it rules this out. On the
other hand, it is easy to see that Ue = (0,30), hence for all c ∈ (0,30), (c,e) |= K¬pos45—you are in a
position to know that the minute hand is not pointing directly to the left, even though you don’t know
exactly what your evidence entails.3
2That is, X is a nonempty set of states, S a collection of subsets of X called epistemic ranges, and v a valuation function;
formulas are evaluated with respect to epistemic scenarios of the form (x,U)where x∈U ∈ S, and (x,U) |=Kϕ ⇔U ⊆ [[ϕ]]U :=
{y ∈ X : (y,U) |= ϕ}.
3Incidentally, in this model you are also in a position to know that your evidence is compatible with the hand pointing
directly to the right, that is, for all c ∈ (0,30), (c,e) |=K¬E¬pos15. By contrast, for each t 6= 15, there is a c ∈ (0,30) such that
(c,e) |= E¬post .
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Of course, in building an epistemic model of this scenario, there is no reason to assume that C itself
constitutes the epistemic state space. Indeed, doing so leads to the potentially problematic implication
that all the uncertainty the agent may face is indexed by the position of the clock’s minute hand.
Example 2. We consider again theWilliamson clock case, except this time we expand the epistemic state
space to include not only the possible positions of the minute hand C, but also an additional parameter
that captures variation in the margin for error. This allows us to “de-couple” the margin for error from the
actual position of the hand, representing a richer space of epistemic possibilities in which the position of
the hand and the margin for error can to some extent vary independently of one another. More precisely,
define an evidence model M′ = (C× (0,1),E′, I′,v′) where
I′e(c,µ) =
{
((1−µ)c,(1−µ)c+30µ)× (0,1) if c ∈ (0,30)
/0 otherwise.
Intuitively, µ captures the (actual) precision of the observation: lower values of µ correspond to higher
precision, and higher values of µ correspond to lower precision (it is easy to see that the length of the
interval I′e(c,µ) is just 30µ). The intervals defined in the previous example arise as the special case where
µ = 1
2
, since I′e(c,
1
2
) =
(
c
2
, c+30
2
)
× (0,1). Notice also that this model assumes that your observation of
the clock provides no evidence at all pertaining to the precision of that observation as captured by the
value of µ , since every possible value of µ is compatible with every interpretation of e. This, of course,
is not a required constraint of the present framework, but merely one we find plausible and convenient
for the current scenario.
Despite the extra richness in the epistemic state space, this evidence model shares several key prop-
erties with the one described in Example 1. As before, one can easily check that (c,µ) ∈ I′e(c,µ) iff
c∈ (0,30), and for all c∈C, I′e(c,µ)⊂ (0,30)×(0,1), so (E1) holds. Moreover, in every state (c,µ), the
first component of I′e(c,µ) contains c in its interior, so this model also satisfies the margin of error prin-
ciple. Furthermore, if we interpret post inM
′ in the obvious way (i.e., by setting v′(post) = {t}× (0,1)),
then the scheme Eϕ → EEϕ does not hold here either: for example, ((15, .3),e) |= E¬pos10 since
10 /∈ (10.5,19.5) and I′e(15, .3) = (10.5,19.5)×(0,1); on the other hand, ((15, .3),e) 6|=EE¬pos10, since
(15,0.4) ∈ I′e(15, .3), and (10, .3) ∈ (9,21)×(0,1) = I
′
e(15,0.4). And finally, analogously to the previous
example, we haveUe =(0,30)×(0,1), so for all c∈ (0,30) and all µ ∈ (0,1), ((c,µ),e) |=K¬pos45.
3.1 Soundness and Completeness for LK,E
When we interpret LE,K in the class of evidence models satisfying (E1), the logic of evidence entailment
and knowledge we obtain is a compound of two familiar logics together with one simple interaction
axiom:
EK= S5K+KTE + (KE),
where (KE) denotes the axiom scheme Kϕ → Eϕ .4
Theorem 1. EK is a sound axiomatization of LE,K with respect to the class of evidence models satisfying
(E1).
Our completeness proof relies on a standard Kripke-style interpretation of LE,K in relational models
and the completeness results pertaining thereto. We therefore begin with a brief review of these notions.
4This axiom system, as an extension of the normal modal logic KT with the universal modality, has previously been studied
in [19] within the standard relational framework. The completeness results obtained therein will help us prove completeness
with respect to evidence models.
74 Uncertainty About Evidence
A relational evidence frame is a pair (X ,RE) where X is a non-empty set and RE is a reflexive,
binary relation on X . A relational evidence model is a relational evidence frame equipped with a
valuation function v : PROP → 2X . The language LE,K is interpreted in a relational evidence model
M = (X ,RE,v) by extending the valuation function via the standard recursive clauses for the Boolean
connectives together with the following:
(M,x) |= Eϕ iff RE(x)⊆ ‖ϕ‖M
(M,x) |= Kϕ iff X = ‖ϕ‖M,
where RE(x) = {y ∈ X : xREy} and ‖ϕ‖M = {x ∈ X : (M,x) |= ϕ}. Thus E is interpreted by universal
quantification over the RE-accessible states (as usual for a box-type modality in standard relational se-
mantics), while K is interpreted as a universal modality, as might be expected from Observation 1. We
omit mention of M when the model is clear from context.
Theorem 2 ([19]). EK is a sound and complete axiomatization of LE,K with respect to the class of
relational evidence models.
Given a relational evidence model M = (X ,RE ,v), consider the tuple MM = (X ,{e}, I,v) where
I = {Ie} and for all x∈X , Ie(x) =RE(x). As shown in Observation 1,MM is an evidence model satisfying
(E1), andUe = X . In particular, every pair (x,e) is an evidence scenario in MM.
Lemma 3. Let M = (X ,RE ,v) be a relational evidence model. Then for all ϕ ∈LE,K and x ∈ X, we have
M,x |= ϕ iff MM ,(x,e) |= ϕ ,
where MM = (X ,{e}, I,v) as described above.
Corollary 4. EK is a complete axiomatization of LE,K with respect to the class of evidence models
satisfying (E1).
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2 and Lemma 3: if ϕ ∈ LE,K is such that 6⊢EK ϕ , then by Theorem
2 there is a relational evidence model M that refutes ϕ at some state x. Then, by Lemma 3, ϕ is also
refuted in MM at the epistemic scenario (x,e), which completes the proof.
4 Evidence Models for Belief
It is natural to wish to extend the framework we have developed to include a representation not only for
knowledge but also belief. Defining this extension is relatively straightforward, as it parallels a similar
construction from previous work [12]. The interest here arises not in the definition itself, but from the
subsequent investigation into the interplay between belief and uncertainty about the interpretation of
evidence.
A doxastic evidence model is simply an evidence modelM= (X ,E, I,v) in which truth is evaluated
with respect to doxastic evidence scenarios, which are tuples of the form (x,e,V ) where (x,e) is an
evidence scenario and /0 6=V ⊆Ue. The subset V is meant to capture the beliefs of the agent: that is, each
y∈V is a world the agent (subjectively) considers possible. Given an evidence modelM= (X ,E, I,v) and
a doxastic evidence scenario (x,e,V ), the semantic clauses for the primitive propositions and Boolean
connectives are as before, while for the modalities we have:
(M,x,e,V ) |= Eϕ iff Ie(x)⊆ [[ϕ ]]
e,V
(M,x,e,V ) |= Kϕ iff Ue ⊆ [[ϕ ]]
e,V
(M,x,e,V ) |= Bϕ iff V ⊆ [[ϕ ]]e,V
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where [[ϕ ]]e,V
M
= {x ∈Ue : (M,x,e,V ) |= ϕ}. Thus, K and E are interpreted essentially as before, while
the belief modality B quantifies universally over V . Intuitively, the set V might be interpreted as the
agent’s “conjecture” about how the world is, given the evidence e, and the requirements that V 6= /0 and
V ⊆ Ue guarantee that the agent does not believe inconsistencies and they believe that their evidence
coheres with the world, respectively.5 This corresponds to the very standard “knowledge-implies-belief”
principle: that is, it makes valid the scheme Kϕ → Bϕ . Note also that, just likeUe, the doxastic range V
is state-independent, which guarantees the validity of the strong introspection principles given in Table
2 and Lemma 5.6
Another constraint one might impose on doxastic evidence scenarios (x,e,V ) is the following:
(E2) y ∈V ⇒ Ie(y)⊆V .
Condition (E2) essentially stipulates that the agent takes evidence entailment seriously: if they consider
it possible that the state of evidence leaves open those worlds in Ie(y), then they consider each such world
possible too. This validates the scheme Bϕ → BEϕ : if the agent believes ϕ then they believe that the
evidence entails ϕ . So it’s a kind of “have responsible beliefs” constraint: you should only believe that
which you believe is entailed by the evidence.
This condition bears a close resemblance to a principle suggested by Stalnaker [27], which he called
“strong belief”, namely: Bϕ → BKϕ , if you belief ϕ then you believe that you know it. This essen-
tially makes belief subjectively indistinguishable from knowledge. In the special context of subset space
models (Observation 2), or more generally whenever the K and E modalities collapse, our (E2) princi-
ple just is Stalnaker’s “strong belief” principle. But in general (E2) is weaker: you may believe many
things without believing that you know them—that is, that they are entailed by every interpretation of the
evidence—instead, what (E2) says is that anything you believe is entailed by those interpretations of the
evidence that you consider possible.
Even this weaker form of Stalnaker’s principle may seem too restrictive, however. Interestingly, it
is possible to drop it as a constraint on doxastic evidence scenarios without abandoning the intuition
entirely. Suppose (x,e,V ) is a doxastic evidence scenario; let V 1 =V , and define, for k > 1,
V k =
⋃
y∈V k−1
Ie(y)
and
V∞ =
∞⋃
k=1
V k.
Then it is easy to see that V 1 ⊆ V 2 ⊆ ·· · is a nested increasing sequence of sets, and V∞ actually does
satisfy (E2)—in fact it’s the smallest set containing V with this property. We might then interpret V∞ as
representing the agent’s most “conservative” beliefs (so the fact that they satisfy the “responsibility” con-
straint, (E2), makes some sense), whereas V =V 1 represents the agent’s least conservative “conjecture”,
with the sequence V 2 ⊆V 3 ⊆ ·· · bridging the gap between these extremes in a series of discrete jumps
or “levels” of belief. This is related to the idea of using plausibility rankings on possible worlds in order
to produce a sequence of beliefs, starting with the “strongest” beliefs and gradually weakening them by
including less plausible (though still possible) worlds [17, 22]. For example, if we apply this idea to
5One can also study agents with possibly inconsistent beliefs in a similar way by simply eliminating the requirement V 6= /0.
6More general semantics for LE,K,B that do not validate these introspection principles can be obtained by interpreting B
with respect to a family of parametrized relations R= {Re}e∈E, where each Re ⊆ X
2, rather than a fixed V given in a doxastic
evidence scenario. Due to the page limit, we leave the details of such a generalization for the extended version of this paper.
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Example 1 starting with the initial conjecture V 1 = (10,20) (corresponding to the belief that the hand of
the clock is pointing between the 2 and the 4), it is easy to see thatV 2 = (5,25), V 3 = (2.5,27.5), . . ., and
V∞ = (0,30). A systematic development of this “ranked belief” framework in the context of evidence
models is left to the full paper.
4.1 Soundness and Completeness for LE,K,B
In order to distinguish the semantics of LE,K,B given with respect to doxastic evidence scenarios from
those proposed for LE,K in Section 3, we call the former doxastic-evidence semantics. Satisfiability and
validity of a formula in doxastic-evidence semantics is defined the same way as given in Section 3.
The weakest logic of evidence, knowledge, and belief we consider in this paper, denoted EKB, is
obtained by strengthening EK with the additional axiom schemes given in Table 2.
(KB) B(ϕ → ψ)→ (Bϕ → Bψ) Distribution of belief
(DB) Bϕ →¬B¬ϕ Consistency of belief
(sPI) Bϕ → KBϕ Strong positive introspection
(KB) Kϕ → Bϕ Knowledge implies belief
Table 2: Additional axiom schemes for EKB
Lemma 5. NecB and ¬Bϕ → K¬Bϕ (strong negative introspection) are derivable in EKB.
Theorem 6. EKB is a sound axiomatization of LE,K,B with respect to the class of evidence models
satisfying (E1) under doxastic-evidence semantics.
The completeness proof again relies on a standard Kripke-style interpretation of LE,K,B in relational
models and the corresponding relational completeness result.
A relational doxastic evidence model M = (X ,RE,RB,v) is a relational evidence model (X ,RE ,v)
equipped with an additional binary relation RB on X such that for all x,y ∈ X , RB(x) 6= /0 and RB(x) =
RB(y). The language LE,K,B is interpreted in a relational doxastic evidence model M = (X ,RE,RB,v) as
before for E and K (see Section 3.1); for B we have:
(M,x) |= Bϕ iff RB(x)⊆ ‖ϕ‖M.
As usual we omit mention of the model when it is clear from context.
Theorem 7. EKB is a sound and complete axiomatization ofLE,K,B with respect to the class of relational
doxastic evidence models.
Proof. While soundness is a matter of routine validity check, completeness follows from a fairly straight-
forward canonical model construction where (sPI) guarantees that for all x,y ∈ X , RB(x) = RB(y) in the
canonical model (see, e.g., [13, Chapters 4 & 7]). For a similar construction for topological subset space
semantics, see [12, pp. 20-21, full paper].
Given a doxastic relational evidence model M = (X ,RE ,RB,v), we construct the evidence model
MM = (X ,{e}, I,v) satisfying (E1) exactly the same way as in Section 3.1. Let V = RB(x) for any x ∈ X
and recall thatUe = X . Therefore, as /0 6=V ⊆Ue, every tuple of the form (x,e,V ) is a doxastic evidence
scenario inMM .
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Lemma 8. LetM= (X ,RE ,RB,v) be a relational doxastic evidence model. Then, for all ϕ ∈LE,K,B and
x ∈ X, we have
M,x |= ϕ iff MM,(x,e,V ) |= ϕ .
Corollary 9. EKB is a complete axiomatization of LE,K,B with respect to the class of evidence models
satisfying (E1) under doxastic-evidence semantics.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Corollary 4, by Theorem 7 and Lemma 8.
We also provide an axiomatization of LE,K,B for evidence models that satisfy (E2) in addition to (E1).
Theorem 10. EKB+(Bϕ → BEϕ) is a sound and complete axiomatization of LE,K,B with respect to the
class of evidence models satisfying (E1) and (E2) under doxastic-evidence semantics.
5 Evidence Models for Knowability
The logics we have considered so far have been static in the sense that they include no mechanism for
an agent to update their information in any way. As a first step toward introducing a dynamic component
to our setting, we consider a simple mechanic for changing the state of evidence. Perhaps the simplest
intuition comes from the case of an agent who takes multiple successive measurements—assuming they
remember the results of previous measurements, it seems reasonable to represent the final state of evi-
dence as a combination e1⊕·· ·⊕ ek, where ei is the evidence state corresponding to the ith observation.
This is captured formally in the definition of an evidence interaction model, which is a tuple M=
(X ,E,⊕, I,v) where (E,⊕) is a meet-semilattice, (X ,E, I,v) is an evidence model satisfying (E1), and for
all x ∈ X and finite E′ ⊆ E, I⊕E′(x) =
⋂
e∈E′ Ie(x). A notion of evidence parthood, denoted by ≤, is given
by
∀e′,e ∈ E(e′ ≤ e iff e′⊕ e= e′). (EP)
Moreover, it is not difficult to see that for all finite E′ ⊆ E,U⊕E′ =
⋂
e∈E′Ue.
Note the analogy with topological spaces. A topological space has the form (X ,T), where T is a
collection of subsets of X called opens, often conceived of as the results of possible measurements.
Evidence spaces effectively replace the topology T with the structure (E, I), so that in place of open
subsets U of X we have families of subsets {Ie(x) : x ∈ X} of X , one for each e ∈ E. Loosely speaking,
topological spaces might be viewed as special cases of evidence spaces where each Ie is a constant
function (cf. Observation 2).
This analogy is taken a step further with evidence interaction models, since the closure of E under
the meet operation ⊕ parallels the closure of T under intersection. Thus, it may be easier to think of
(E,⊕, I) as the analog of a basis for X , rather than a full topology. We can also define a kind of general-
ized interior operator in evidence interactions models, and use it to articulate a notion of measurability
corresponding to what the agent could come to know after taking a sufficiently good measurement or oth-
erwise obtaining a sufficiently strong piece of evidence (see [11, 12, 10]). Given an evidence interaction
model (X ,E,⊕, I,v) and an evidence scenario (x,e), we interpret the propositional variables, Boolean
connectives, K, and E as before, and for 2 we define
(M,x,e) |= 2ϕ iff ∃e′ ∈ E(x ∈Ue⊕e′ ⊆ [[ϕ ]]
e).
Thus, 2ϕ holds just in case there is some piece of evidence e′ that, when combined with the agent’s
current evidence e, would result in knowledge of [[ϕ ]]e.
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5.1 Soundness and Completeness for LE,K,2
The logic of evidence, knowledge, and knowability is obtained by strengthening EK as follows
EKK= EK+S42 + (K2),
where (K2) denotes the axiom scheme Kϕ →2ϕ .
Theorem 11. EKK is a sound axiomatization of LE,K,2 with respect to the class of evidence interaction
models.
Similarly to the previous completeness proofs, we prove the completeness of EKK via a detour to
the standard relational interpretation of LE,K,2 and its corresponding relational completeness. More
precisely, we rely on the completeness of EKK—under the standard Kripke semantics—with respect to
the class of finite models of the form M = (X ,RE,R2,v) where RE is reflexive and R2 is reflexive and
transitive. We call such structures relational evidence and knowability models. While K and E are
interpreted in a relational evidence and knowability model as before, 2 is interpreted, in the standard
way, via the accessibility relation R2:
(M,x) |= 2ϕ iff R2(x)⊆ ‖ϕ‖M.
Theorem 12. EKK is a sound and complete axiomatization of LE,K,2 with respect to the class of finite
relational evidence and knowability models.
We now construct an evidence interaction model MM = (X ,E,⊕, I,v) from a finite relational evi-
dence and knowability model M = (X ,RE ,R2,v) in such a way that M and MM are point-wise modally
equivalent with respect to LE,K,2. While finiteness of the model is not essential, it will simplify our
construction.
Let M = (X ,RE ,R2,v) be a finite relational evidence and knowability model and denote the set of
all upsets of the preordered set (X ,R2) byUp(X). Since X is finite, Up(X) is finite. Therefore, we can
enumerate the elements of Up(X) and write Up(X) = {E1, . . . ,En}. Note that X ∈Up(X), so, wlog,
we let X = En. For each element in Up(X), we put a corresponding element in E = {e1, . . . ,en} (so en
is the evidence state corresponding to X—this will become clearer below). We then define an evidence
parthood relation ≤ on E as
∀ei,e j ∈ E(ei ≤ e j iff Ei ⊆ E j).
It is easy to see that (E,≤) is a poset with the top element en, that is, e j ≤ en for all e j ∈ E. We can define
the corresponding meet, ei⊕ e j, in a standard way as the greatest lower bound of {ei,e j} with respect to
≤. More generally, for any finite E′ ⊆ E, the element ⊕E′ is the greatest lower bound of E′ with respect
to ≤ (see, e.g., [15] for a general introduction to lattice theory). Finally, for all x ∈ X and ei ∈ E, set
Iei(x) = Ei∩RE(x). Notice that, as En = X , we have Ien(x) = RE(x).
Lemma 13. Given a finite relational evidence and knowability model M = (X ,RE ,R2,v), the structure
MM = (X ,E,⊕, I,v) constructed in the above described way is an evidence interaction model.
Lemma 14. Let M = (X ,RE ,R2,v) be a finite relational evidence and knowability model. Then, for all
ϕ ∈ LE,K,2 and x ∈ X, we have
M,x |= ϕ iff (MM ,x,en) |= ϕ .
Corollary 15. EKK is a complete axiomatization of LE,K,2 with respect to the class of evidence interac-
tion models.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Corollary 4, by Theorem 12 and Lemma 14.
Theorem 16. S42 is a sound and complete axiomatization of L2 with respect to the class of evidence
interaction models.
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6 Further Work
We introduced evidence models as a means of representing agents who may be uncertain about what
their evidence actually entails. We also explored some extensions of this framework that include belief
and knowability. There are many interesting avenues to continue this line of work. From a philosophical
angle, we believe the framework we have developed here is well-suited to the analysis of a variety of
conceptual puzzles that arise when less flexible models of evidence entailment are implicitly relied upon,
while on the more mathematical side, it is clear that the logical systems we defined have a variety of
natural extensions.
In Section 4, for example, we outlined a way of using evidence interpretations to extend an agent’s
initial conjecture to a graded notion of belief/plausibility. And in Section 5, the account of knowability
we provided only scratched the surface of the potential for developing fully dynamic logics atop this
foundation. Consider a public announcement style update mechanic in which knowability plays the role
of the precondition of the corresponding announcement, as in [11]. The effect of an announcement
is then manifested as a transition from the initial evidence state to a more informative one, without
requiring global changes in the given model, as in logics of information dynamics interpreted on subset
space models [28, 12, 16, 6, 3]. The enriched structure owing to the evidence states and their variable
interpretations raises the question of whether such a dynamic logic can be reduced to a weaker, static
logic, as is often the case in similar settings.
When we view evidence models as a generalization of subset space models (recall Observation 2),
another natural dynamic extension suggests itself: adding the so-called effort modality, the trademark
of subset space logics. The effort modality, denoted here by ϕ , is intended to capture a notion of
“epistemic effort”, such as taking further measurements, and might be read in the present context as
“ϕ becomes true after some further evidence intake”. It can then be naturally interpreted on evidence
interaction models as
(x,e) |= ϕ iff (∃e
′ ∈ E)(x ∈Ue⊕e′ and (x,e⊕ e
′) |= ϕ).
Incorporating such an operator in the current setting would provide a formal framework in which we
could study a truly dynamic notion of knowability via the scheme Kϕ , as opposed to its static counter-
part 2ϕ (see also [11] for a discussion of the same issue in topological subset space semantics). More-
over, the relationship between  and our static modalities K,B,E , and 2 could help further the research
on dynamic logics for topological formal learning theory [23], initiated by [4, 5] and further developed
within subset space style logics in [3]. Such investigations are the subject of ongoing research.
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